Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz: Operational Update
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Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz: Operational Update
Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz: Operational Update
The security environment in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waters remains highly volatile. In view of the recent escalation and the continuing threat to commercial shipping, Members are strongly advised to avoid transiting the Strait of Hormuz unless the transit is operationally essential. Where practicable, voyages requiring passage through the Strait should be deferred or alternative arrangements considered until the security situation improves.
This recommendation reflects the seriousness of the current threat environment. JMIC records 149 vessel incidents across the wider region since 1 March 2026, including nine since its previous report. The Strait of Hormuz is currently assessed by JMIC as SEVERE, meaning deliberate hostile action is considered highly likely. The Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman are assessed as MODERATE.
IRGC activity affecting merchant shipping has continued, including UAV overflights, targeted surveillance of vessels and VHF hailing. Traffic through the Strait remains substantially below the 2025 baseline of approximately 138 vessels per day. Independent tracking indicates non-facilitated transits in single digits in each direction, while U.S.-assisted transits averaged approximately 30 per day during the 96 hours to 14 October.
Recent attacks on commercial shipping
The latest available JMIC Advisory Update 105, dated 15 October, records eight projectile attacks against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz over two days. On 11 October, three tankers and one container ship were struck. On 13 October, three container ships and one tanker were struck. Both inbound and outbound vessels were affected, although most of the incidents involved outbound traffic.
The consequences varied. Several vessels sustained minor damage and were able to continue their voyages. One crude oil tanker reported itself not under command and one crew member suffered a minor injury. A container ship caught fire, subsequently drifted and sank on 14 October approximately four nautical miles northwest of Ras Shaykh Masud. All crew were evacuated without injury. The status of debris, cargo and pollution remains unconfirmed.
Mariners should also be aware of the wreck and reported floating containers near 26-16.8N 056-08.6E, identified in NAVAREA IX 373/26. The IRGC has claimed that a container ship struck a naval mine while following an unauthorised route. JMIC states that this claim has not been substantiated. Nevertheless, the possibility of attempted mining within or adjacent to the traffic separation scheme represents an additional navigational and security concern.
Vessels operating with AIS on should also be prepared for an elevated targeting risk and for directed VHF hails instructing vessels to divert towards the northern, Iranian-controlled route.
Risk extends beyond the Strait.
The present exposure is not confined to vessels physically transiting the Strait.
On 11 October, a products tanker near Sohar anchorage, Oman, was struck by a UAV and the crew evacuated. India’s Ministry of External Affairs subsequently reported two crew members missing. As of 14 October, the vessel was drifting approximately 50 nautical miles northeast of Sohar.
JMIC has warned that, should the present pattern continue, further incidents could affect tankers and container ships at UAE anchorages, including Ras Al Khaimah, Umm al Quwain, Sharjah and potentially Fujairah. Inbound and outbound vessels using the southern Omani corridor could also be exposed.
This is particularly significant given the concentration of commercial tonnage currently waiting in the area. As of 15 October, approximately 180 vessels were reportedly at anchor off Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, 178 between Dubai, Jebel Ali and Ras Al Khaimah, and 74 off Musandam and Sohar.
JMIC has indicated that stationary vessels, particularly those remaining identifiable through AIS while static, may face an elevated targeting risk.
The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports also remains in force. Unauthorised entry to or departure from Iranian ports may result in interception or the use of force. Neutral transits remain permitted, although vessels should anticipate the possibility of visit and search checks. A 30 nautical mile standoff from U.S. units is advised.
Ports and anchorages
There is presently no verified region-wide closure of Persian Gulf ports. This should not, however, be interpreted as indicating that normal operating conditions prevail.
The circumstances at individual ports, terminals and anchorages may differ materially and can change at short notice. Port accessibility alone should therefore not be treated as an indication that proceeding into the area is safe or advisable.
Before any voyage into the affected region is undertaken, current conditions concerning port access, pilotage, berth availability, anchorages and local restrictions should be verified directly with the relevant port or terminal and local agents.
Members considering unavoidable voyages
Against this Where a vessel must nevertheless enter the affected area or undertake a transit for operational reasons, the decision should be taken only after a vessel and voyage-specific security and operational risk assessment based on the most current information available.
For such voyages, operators should maintain a high degree of flexibility in voyage planning, ETAs, port calls and berth arrangements. Particular attention should be given to the potential for electronic navigational interference, heightened military activity, communications from military or security forces, and rapidly changing conditions at ports, anchorages and within the transit corridor.
Conditions should be reassessed throughout the voyage rather than solely at the planning stage. A previous successful transit, or the continued movement of other commercial vessels through the area, should not in itself be taken as evidence that a subsequent transit can be undertaken safely.
Members and operators should closely monitor the latest UKMTO, JMIC, flag-state, coastal-state and relevant port and terminal information before entering the affected region and again before committing to a Strait of Hormuz transit.
Given the speed at which the security environment is developing, Members should remain prepared to delay, divert or reconsider planned movements where circumstances permit. background, avoidance or deferral of a Strait of Hormuz transit should presently be the preferred course wherever reasonably practicable.
Where a vessel must nevertheless enter the affected area or undertake a transit for operational reasons, the decision should be taken only after a vessel and voyage-specific security and operational risk assessment based on the most current information available.
For such voyages, operators should maintain a high degree of flexibility in voyage planning, ETAs, port calls and berth arrangements. Particular attention should be given to the potential for electronic navigational interference, heightened military activity, communications from military or security forces, and rapidly changing conditions at ports, anchorages and within the transit corridor.
Conditions should be reassessed throughout the voyage rather than solely at the planning stage. A previous successful transit, or the continued movement of other commercial vessels through the area, should not in itself be taken as evidence that a subsequent transit can be undertaken safely.
Members and operators should closely monitor the latest UKMTO, JMIC, flag-state, coastal-state and relevant port and terminal information before entering the affected region and again before committing to a Strait of Hormuz transit.
Given the speed at which the security environment is developing, Members should remain prepared to delay, divert or reconsider planned movements where circumstances permit.